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I.

INTRODUCTION

In June 2009, the United States Department of the Treasury issued its white paper report, Financial Regulatory Reform: A New Founda1
tion (“Report”). The Report contains the Obama Administration’s
proposed regulatory response to the economic downturn that began
2
in 2008. Notably, the drafters of the Report characterized the economic downturn as the “most severe financial crisis since the Great
3
Depression.” The severity of the economic downturn has led some
commentators to refer to the financial crisis as the “Great Reces4
sion.” Other commentators have gone so far as to term the economic downturn as a “depression” itself because of the depth of the downturn, the radicalism of the government’s response, and the general
5
sense of crisis. Even though the economy in the United States has
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1
U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, FINANCIAL REGULATORY REFORM: A NEW
FOUNDATION (2009), available at http://www.financialstability.gov/docs/regs/
FinalReport_web.pdf.
2
Id.
3
Id. at 2.
4
But see Catherine Rampell, ‘Great Recession’: A Brief Etymology, ECONOMIX
(Mar. 11, 2009, 5:39 PM), http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/03/11/greatrecession-a-brief-etymology (“Nobody can take credit for coining the term ‘The Great
Recession’ . . . . Why? . . . Every recession of the last several decades has, at some
point or another, received this special designation . . . .”).
5
See RICHARD A. POSNER, A FAILURE OF CAPITALISM: THE CRISIS OF ‘08 AND THE
DESCENT INTO DEPRESSION x (2009) (“It is the gravity of the economic downturn, the
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somewhat rebounded, these indicators of a depression have arguably
still been met because of the initial sharp economic decline, the federal government’s unprecedented bailout of the financial services in6
dustry, and the panic that the financial crisis has created.
In the shadow of the financial downturn that began in 2008, the
Report details the Obama Administration’s five main policy objectives
for preventing a future crisis:
• Promote Robust Supervision and Regulation of Financial
Firms
• Establish Comprehensive Regulation of Financial Markets
• Protect Consumers and Investors from Financial Abuse
• Provide the Government with the Tools it Needs to Manage Financial Crises
• Raise International Regulatory Standards and Improve In7
ternational Cooperation

The stated goal that underlies these policy objectives is to “build a
new foundation for financial regulation and supervision that is simpler and more effectively enforced, that protects consumers and investors, that rewards innovation and that is able to adapt and evolve with
8
changes in the financial market.” The drafters of the Report suggest
broad and sweeping financial regulatory reform because of the nu9
merous causes of the financial crisis.
In regard to raising international regulatory standards and improving international cooperation, the drafters of the Report state
the following:
As we have witnessed during this crisis, financial stress can spread
easily and quickly across national boundaries. Yet, regulation is
still set largely in a national context. Without consistent supervision and regulation, financial institutions will tend to move their
activities to jurisdictions with looser standards, creating a race to
the bottom and intensifying systemic risk for the entire global fi10
nancial system.

radicalism of the government’s responses, and the pervading sense of crisis that mark
what the economy is going through as a depression.”).
6
Id.
7
U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, supra note 1, at 1.
8
Id. at 2.
9
See infra Part II.B (discussing the causes of the financial crisis that began in
2008).
10
U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, supra note 1, at 80.
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Put another way, patchwork regulation does not work to regulate the
11
emerging global financial markets because it generates a race-to-thebottom in which nations ratchet down their systems of regulation and
enforcement to suboptimal levels in an attempt to gain a competitive
12
advantage over other nations.
Through the Report, the Obama Administration proposes the
following international regulatory reforms:
• Strengthen the International Capital Framework
• Improve the Oversight of Global Financial Markets
• Enhance Supervision of Internationally Active Financial
Firms
• Reform Crisis Prevention and Management Authorities
and Procedures
• Strengthen the Financial Stability Board
• Strengthen Prudential Regulations
• Expand the Scope of Regulation
• Introduce Better Compensation Practices
• Promote Stronger Standards in the Prudential Regulation,
Money Laundering/Terrorist Financing, and Tax Information Exchange Areas
• Improve Accounting Standards
13
• Tighten Oversight of Credit Rating Agencies

Despite this lengthy and ambitious list, the specific proposals in the
Report do little to remedy the problems created by fragmented regulation of the emerging global financial markets, even after the drafters of the Report expressly recognized the problems that regulatory
14
fragmentation creates.
Of major concern is the lack of a concrete proposal for working
toward the harmonization and centralization of international securities law. The goals relating to international reform chiefly focus on
11
See infra Part II.A (describing the transition from national capital markets to
global capital markets).
12
See Roberta S. Karmel & Claire R. Kelly, The Hardening of Soft Law in Securities
Regulation, 34 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 883, 946–47 (2009) (“The absence of a single international securities law regulator creates the potential for a classic regulatory race to
the bottom. Race to the bottom theorists assume that regulatory competition and
the lack of a single mandatory framework will encourage managers to incorporate in
jurisdictions that have the least demanding regulatory structure.”).
13
U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, supra note 1, at 80–88.
14
Id. at 80 (“As we have witnessed during this crisis, financial stress can spread
easily and quickly across national boundaries. Yet, regulation is still set largely in a
national context. Without consistent supervision and regulation, financial institutions will tend to move their activities to jurisdictions with looser standards, creating
a race to the bottom and intensifying systemic risk for the entire global financial system.”).
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15

the regulation of financial firms, despite the fact that mortgage16
backed securities were at the heart of the financial crisis. The Report declares that “the United States must continue to work with our
international counterparts to raise international standards for OTC
[(Over-the-Counter)] derivatives markets, further integrate our financial market infrastructures, and avoid measures that may result in
17
market fragmentation.” But the Report fails to provide concrete
proposals as to how such harmonization can be achieved. In fact, the
only specific securities regulation reform that the drafters of the Report propose is the tightening of oversight on the credit rating agencies that rated the mortgage-backed securities, which gave birth to
18
the financial crisis. This does little to address the systemic weakness
and race-to-the-bottom that the regulatory fragmentation of international securities law creates.
This Article advocates for the harmonization and centralization
of international securities regulation as a means of preventing future
financial crises. In other articles, I have discussed the opportunity
that the financial crisis that began in 2008 presents for reimagining
19
international securities regulation, the need for comprehensive do20
mestic and international regulatory reform to prevent future crises,
the United States federal government’s role in reimagining interna21
tional securities regulation, the need for a centralized global securi22
ties regulator, and the evolutionary method by which a centralized

15
See id. at 80–88 (containing the Obama Administration’s goals relating to international reform in response to the financial crisis that began in 2008); see also supra note 13 and accompanying text.
16
See infra notes 56–62 and accompanying text (describing the role of mortgagebacked securities in the financial crisis that began in 2008).
17
U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, supra note 1, at 81.
18
See id. at 87 (stating that the Obama Administration via the United States Department of the Treasury “urge[s] national authorities to enhance their regulatory
regimes to effectively oversee credit rating agencies (CRAs), consistent with international standards and the G-20 Leaders’ recommendations”).
19
See Eric C. Chaffee, A Moment of Opportunity: Reimagining International Securities
Regulation in the Shadow of Financial Crisis, 15 NEXUS 29 (2010).
20
See Eric C. Chaffee, A Panoramic View of the Financial Crisis that Began in 2008:
The Need for Domestic and International Regulatory Reform, 35 U. DAYTON L. REV. 1 (2009).
21
See Eric C. Chaffee, The Internationalization of Securities Regulation: The United
States Government’s Role in Regulating the Global Capital Markets, 5 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 187
(2010).
22
See Eric C. Chaffee, Evolution, Not Revolution, in International Securities Regulation:
A Modest Proposal for a Global Securities and Exchange Commission (forthcoming).
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23

global securities regulator might emerge. This Article adds to the
existing scholarship in three main ways. First, it provides an in-depth
discussion of the arguments for harmonization and centralization of
international securities regulation—including that harmonization
and centralization will help minimize risk in the emerging capital
24
25
markets, increase market efficiency, and pool the expertise and
26
experience of the world’s securities regulators. Second, this Article
provides an in-depth discussion of the arguments against harmonization and centralization—including that harmonization and centrali27
zation do not yield the same benefits as regulatory competition,
cannot be implemented in the current international regulatory envi28
ronment, and would result in a loss of autonomy for the United
29
States. Third, this Article concludes that harmonization and centralization offer the best path forward in international securities regulation and discusses the evolutionary process through which a harmonized and centralized system might emerge.
The remainder of this Article is structured as follows. Part II of
this Article examines the emerging global capital markets and the
need to reform international securities regulation. Part III provides
various arguments in favor of the harmonization and centralization of

23
See Eric C. Chaffee, Contemplating the Endgame: An Evolutionary Model for the
Harmonization and Centralization of International Securities Regulation, 78 U. CIN. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2010).
24
See infra Part III.A (discussing why the harmonization and centralization of international securities law will help to minimize risk in the emerging global capital
markets, including that such an approach will end the international race-to-thebottom in securities regulation, create a seamless system of regulation that reduces
regulatory and enforcement gaps, and reduce spillover risks from regional or national financial crises).
25
See infra Part III.B (discussing why the harmonization and centralization of international securities law increases market efficiency, including that such an approach reduces transaction costs, removes barriers to efficiency, and increases investor confidence).
26
See infra Part III.C (discussing why harmonization and centralization of international securities law is beneficial because it pools the expertise and experience of
the world’s securities regulators).
27
See infra notes 176–181 and accompanying text (responding to criticisms that
the harmonization and centralization of international securities law would prevent
the benefits of regulatory competition).
28
See infra notes 182–190 and accompanying text (responding to criticisms that
the harmonization and centralization of international securities law would be impossible to implement).
29
See infra notes 191–192 and accompanying text (responding to criticisms that
the harmonization and centralization of international securities law would not be in
the best interests of the United States because it would result in a loss of autonomy
for the United States).
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international securities law, and Part IV analyzes various arguments
against such harmonization and centralization. In Part V, this Article
concludes that harmonization and centralization offer the best method of regulating the emerging global capital markets, and although
such harmonization and centralization is unrealistic in the shortterm, the United States and other nations should begin the slow evolutionary process toward a harmonized and centralized system of international securities law.
II. THE EMERGING GLOBAL CAPITAL MARKETS AND THE NEED TO
REFORM INTERNATIONAL SECURITIES REGULATION
The world’s capital markets are transitioning from being nation30
al or regional in nature to being global. This transition creates new
challenges in terms of international securities law because securities
regulation remains fragmented between regulators in individual na31
tions or regions. As discussed in the previous section, patchwork
regulation will not work to effectively regulate the emerging global
32
markets. This section explores the reasons for the transition from
national and regional capital markets to global markets, how this
transition contributed to the financial crisis that began in 2008, and
the various models that might be used to regulate the emerging global markets.
A. The Transition to Global Capital Markets
In recent years, the world’s capital markets have experienced a
dramatic transformation as they have shifted from being national or
regional in nature to being global. For much of the twentieth century, many viewed the United States as having the world’s premier
30
See Susan Wolburgh Jenah, Commentary on A Blueprint from Cross-Border
Access to U.S. Investors: A New International Framework, 48 HARV. INT’L L.J. 69, 69–
70 (2007) (“Globalization is a fact. Innovative technologies are driving faster and
more efficient trading, and they do not recognize national borders. Capital market
participants are expanding their business activities into foreign markets. Investors
are seeking international investment opportunities. The impact of these changes is
profound and not yet fully realized.”); Roberta S. Karmel, The Case for a European Securities Commission, 38 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 9, 31 (1999) (“[S]ecurities trading has
become globalized and stock exchanges conduct business in a manner that transcends national boundaries.”).
31
See supra note 10 and accompanying text (noting that financial regulation is
still determined by national regulators, despite the fact that financial distress can
now spread easily and quickly across national borders).
32
See supra notes 10–12 (arguing that patchwork regulation of the emerging
global capital markets creates global systemic risk and a race-to-the-bottom in terms
of international securities regulation).
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capital markets and premier system of securities regulation. From
this dominant position, the United States was able to export its theories of securities regulation and enforcement to other nations and
34
regions. During this period, the United States also served as a coordinating force in international securities law because its dominant
position allowed it to influence other nations’ and regions’ capital
35
markets and systems of securities regulation. During the twenty-first
century, however, the dominance of the United States has been wan36
ing as global capital markets have begun to emerge. The United
States’ ability to be a coordinating force in international securities law
has also begun to weaken because it no longer acts from a position of
37
dominance. The emergence of global capital markets has occurred
33
See Robert G. DeLaMater, Recent Trends in SEC Regulation of Foreign Issuers: How
the U.S. Regulatory Regime is Affecting the United States’ Historic Position as the World’s Principal Capital Market, 39 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 109, 109 (2006) (“Since World War II, the
United States has been the world’s principal capital market. This market has been
uniquely broad and deep, with substantial retail participation by individual investors
and small institutions, plentiful capital for equity financing and a willingness to hold
long-term debt securities . . . .”); Howell E. Jackson, A System of Selective Substitute Compliance, 48 HARV. INT’L L.J. 105, 119 (2007) (“For much of the twentieth century, the
[SEC] justly considered itself to be the world’s premier securities market regulator.”).
34
See George W. Madison & Stewart P. Greene, TIAA-CREF Response to A Blueprint for Cross-Border Access to U.S. Investors: A New International Framework, 48
HARV. INT’L L.J. 99, 100 (2007) (“The SEC performs it task admirably—and sets the
standard against which all other regulators around the globe are judged. . . . The
SEC, with its track record and high standards for protecting investors, has historically
been a leader in setting benchmarks for market regulation.”).
35
Id.
36
See Edward F. Greene, Beyond Borders: Time to Tear Down the Barriers to Global Investing, 48 HARV. INT’L L.J. 85, 85 (2007) (“There can be no argument that the securities markets are now global and the dominance of the United States as the leading
player in the global marketplace is being challenged.”); Jackson, supra note 33, at 119
(“[T]he capital markets of many other countries have developed and the supervisory
capabilities of many jurisdictions have expanded—often with the assistance of advice
from the SEC or the International Organization of Securities Commissions. Today, a
number of these jurisdictions provide capital market oversight that is substantially
equivalent to SEC supervision.”).
37
See DeLaMater, supra note 33, at 116 (“[T]he U.S. model is not as well regarded as it was a few years ago, it is no longer the gold standard to which other regulatory schemes could only aspire. The U.S. model has been tarnished by the scandals of 2001 and 2002, as all of Enron, WorldCom, Tyco, Adelphia and the other
companies so prominent among the scandals were obviously SEC-registered, listed
on U.S. stock exchanges, and audited under U.S. generally accepted auditing standards.”); Greene, supra note 36, at 85 (“The SEC can no longer afford to sit on the
sidelines and pretend that the U.S. market is the only game in town. It must acknowledge that other securities markets and regulators have matured to the point
where they rival (and some might argue exceed) the United States in sophistication.”); Roberta S. Karmel, The EU Challenge to the SEC, 31 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1692,
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for a variety of reasons, including the evolution of securities trading,
the rise of other strong new securities markets, and the aggressive
regulation of the capital markets in the United States.
The transition from national or regional capital markets to global capital markets has been fueled in large part by the evolution of securities trading. Technology now affords investors with nearly limit38
less investment opportunities around the globe. Although foreign
issuers and other sellers may be prohibited from directly soliciting in39
vestors within the borders of some nations, both retail and institutional investors are free to seek out opportunities abroad and to pur40
chase securities on foreign exchanges. In the United States, both
retail and institutional investors seek out foreign investment opportunities as a means of portfolio diversification and to take advantage
41
of fluctuations in currency exchange rates. Indeed, foreign invest-

1711 (2008) (“Since the SEC has served as the gold standard of securities regulation,
it is not surprising that as the EU has striven to improve and integrate European capital markets, it has looked to U.S. securities regulation as a model. Yet, changing
economics, and in particular the migration of many international issuers to the London markets, has given the EU more power in influencing the SEC.”); see also Eric J.
Pan, Single Stock Futures and Cross-Border Access for U.S. Investors, 14 STAN. J.L. BUS. &
FIN. 221, 228 (2008) (“The capacity of investors and issuers to purchase and sell securities in markets outside of the United States challenges the SEC’s ability to ensure
that the raising of capital from U.S. investors is subject to SEC approved standards of
investor protection and market integrity.”).
38
See Greene, supra note 36, at 86 (“The rise of the internet has given investors a
new window on the world and access to almost limitless information. A natural outgrowth of this technological revolution, coupled with increasing investor sophistication and the need for financial diversification that transcends home country borders,
is the understandable desire of investors to communicate and effect transactions directly with market participants located in other jurisdictions.”).
39
See Jackson, supra note 33, at 111 (“U.S. retail investors face serious problems
receiving information about foreign investment opportunities. Most notably, foreign
broker dealers are prohibited from soliciting most U.S. retail investors unless those
firms comply with SEC registration and compliance requirements.”); Eric J. Pan, A
European Solution to the Regulation of Cross-Border Markets, 2 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM.
L. 133, 157 (2007) (“[T]he SEC has prevented foreign exchanges from offering services directly to U.S. investors without registering as a U.S. exchange.”).
40
See Jackson, supra note 33, at 108 (“Increasingly[,] major institutional investors
have established offices overseas in key financial centers, like London and Tokyo,
and prefer to trade their foreign securities in the home market of issuers . . . . Institutions that lack foreign offices also prefer off-shore trading venues for foreign securities and can effect trading on these markets through relationships with foreign brokers . . . .”).
41
See Greene, supra note 36, at 85–86 (“Investing in non-U.S. markets is no longer the exclusive province of megainstutions or the ultrawealthy; it is an essential
component of prudent portfolio diversification for all investors.”).
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ment by both retail and institutional investors in the United States
42
has increased dramatically within the past few years.
The evolution of securities trading has also fueled the emergence of global capital markets because securities exchanges have
begun to evolve into transnational entities. The recent wave of securities exchange demutualization has transformed securities exchanges
into for-profit entities that are willing to eschew previous nationalistic
and protectionist tendencies in favor of seeking out new profitmaking opportunities regardless of whether they are foreign or do43
mestic.
This wave of securities exchange demutualization has
44
touched off a wave of securities exchange consolidation. When the
merger between the New York Stock Exchange and Euronext was
completed on April 4, 2007, the world saw the birth of the first trans45
national securities exchange. The ensuing push for the consolidation of other exchanges continues to break down national barriers
46
and to aid in the emergence of a global capital market.
42

See Karmel, supra note 37, at 1711 (“U.S. investors are buying foreign securities
in record numbers and foreign issuers no longer believe they need to make offerings
in the U.S. to raise capital.”); see also Pan, supra note 37, at 229 (“U.S. investors have
become mobile because of new ways for them to be exposed to foreign securities and
their changing preferences in favor of foreign securities.”).
43
See Jenah, supra note 30, at 71 (arguing that the demutualization of many securities exchanges has “unleashed pressure from shareholders to increase profits
through expansion, investment in new technology, and cost cutting, forcing these
for-profit entities to eschew nationalistic or protectionist tendencies in the bid for
value maximization”); Roberta S. Karmel, The Once and Future New York Stock Exchange: The Regulation of Global Exchanges, 1 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 355, 356
(2007) (“Another factor in the inevitable globalization of exchanges is that the exchanges have demutualized and become public companies. They need to please
their shareholders as well as their customers.”).
44
See Pan, supra note 39, at 136 (“Demutualization and increased competition
has led to a wave of consolidation by the European exchanges.”).
45
See generally Bo Harvey, Note, Exchange Consolidation and Models of International
Securities Regulation, 18 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 151 (2007) (discussing the evolution
of international securities law in the wake of the New York Stock Exchange and Euronext merger); Sara M. Saylor, Note, Are Securities Regulators Prepared for a Truly
Transnational Exchange, 33 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 685 (2008) (discussing the New York
Stock Exchange and Euronext merger and the resulting need to reimagine international securities regulation). But see Pan, supra note 37, at 232 (“While the NYSE and
Euronext can enjoy the savings of reduced overhead and shared trading technology
and systems, the main benefit of the merger will be achieved only when investors and
issuers are granted full access to all markets operated by the combined entity.”).
46
See Jenah, supra note 30, at 71 (“[The] chess game of proposed exchange mergers, capital tie-ups, and alliances being played out on the global stage bears witness
to the truism that capital markets are global.”); see also Karmel, supra note 37, at 1711
(“The merger of the NYSE and Euronext probably was a wakeup call to both the SEC
and the EU signaling the need for convergence of their regulatory systems, increased
cooperation among regulators, and a new approach to mutual recognition.”).
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The world’s capital markets are also transitioning from being national and regional in nature to being global because capital markets
outside of the United States have grown in both size and sophistication. Despite the dominance of the United States during much of
the twentieth century, the United States now competes with strong
markets in Asia, Europe, and South America to attract issuers, inves47
tors, and other market participants. The capital markets in the Eu48
ropean Union have grown in both breadth and depth, and the rise
of strong markets in Brazil, Russia, India, and China, which are often
referred to as the “BRIC” nations, demonstrates that focus has begun
49
to shift away from the markets in the United States. The result has
been that issuers, investors, and other market participants look for
opportunities globally, rather than on a national or regional basis.
The United States also fueled the emergence of global capital
markets by pursuing aggressive regulation of its own national capital
markets. For example, the United States experienced a significant
drop in initial public offerings by foreign issuers as a result of the pas50
sage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, which placed extensive new
corporate governance requirements on entities wishing to issue stock
51
in the United States. In addition, many commentators argue that
47
See DeLaMater, supra note 33, at 117 (“The securities markets outside the
United States have grown in breadth and depth of their own over the past twenty
years and now afford issuers in their home countries significant opportunities for financing that did not previously exist.”); Donald C. Langevoort, U.S. Securities Regulation and Global Competition, 3 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 191, 194–95 (2008) (“[C]ompetition
has eroded the United States’ once massive advantage for reasons unrelated to regulation except for the increasing quality of what other countries are doing. As global
markets improve, U.S. investors, both institutional and retail, have expanded their
geographic reach so as to be almost as willing and able to trade in those markets as in
New York.”).
48
See Karmel, supra note 43, at 363 (“Marketplace developments in recent years
also made a U.S. listing less attractive for foreign issuers. The European markets
have matured to a point where capital can be raised there to meet the needs of most
companies. Foreign, and even some U.S. companies, engaging in IPOs or stock exchange listings have done so in Europe, rather than in the United States.”).
49
See Karmel, supra note 37, at 1711–12 (“The new strong capital markets in
Asia and South America, and in particular in the so-called BRIC countries (Brazil,
Russia, India, and China), challenge both the EU and the SEC to shape their regulatory approaches to foreign issuers and foreign financial institutions so as not to lose
their competitive places as market regulators.”).
50
See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified at
15 U.S.C. §§ 7201–7266 (2006)).
51
See Karmel, supra note 43, at 356–57 (“[T]he primary reasons why the NYSE
has been losing listings are that foreign issuers are disenchanted with the U.S. stock
market because of the costs of compliance with the requirements of the SarbanesOxley Act of 2002 (Sarbanes-Oxley) and because of the U.S. culture of shareholder
litigation.”). But see Jackson, supra note 33, at 108 (“Although many have pointed to
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issuers, investors, and other market participants have been driven
abroad because of the United States’ culture of shareholder litigation
and history of aggressive enforcement by the United States Securities
and Exchange Commission (“SEC”), which create expenses for issu52
ers that are ultimately passed on to the holders of their securities.
B. International Securities Law and the Great Recession
As discussed in the introduction of this Article, the financial crisis that began in 2008, which some have termed the “Great Recession,” resulted in part from a race-to-the-bottom in international se53
curities law. The causes of the financial crisis are complex and will
be debated for years to come. Although a thorough and complete
analysis of the financial crisis is beyond the scope of this Article, a few
words ought to be included about how the financial crisis came into
being and why the current system of international securities law is in
part to blame. The origins of the financial crisis are important because they demonstrate the inherent systemic weakness in the current
dominant model of international securities regulation.
To grossly oversimplify, the financial crisis resulted from the devaluation of mortgage-backed securities. In the early years of the
twenty-first century, lenders began issuing large numbers of high-risk
mortgages to individuals and other entities that were unlikely to re54
55
pay. This created a “bubble” in housing prices. The high-risk
mortgages were then pooled together with other assets and sold to
special purpose entities, which allowed the lenders to quickly realize

the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 as damaging the ability of U.S. exchanges to compete for foreign cross-listings, there is ample evidence that the erosion of U.S. market power for foreign listings was already underway well before
2002.”).
52
See Jenah, supra note 30, at 71 (arguing that “the increased regulatory burden
in the United States, combined with mounting concerns over exposure to U.S.-style
class actions and more aggressive enforcement, may be driving companies to raise
capital in foreign markets”).
53
See sources cited supra notes 10–12 (arguing that patchwork regulation of the
emerging global capital markets will result in a race-to-the-bottom in terms of international securities law).
54
See David Schmudde, Responding to the Subprime Mess: The New Regulatory Landscape, 14 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 709, 710–11 (2009) (“As the real estate bubble
inflated and creative mortgage methods were invented, all proven rules were ignored. . . . Consumers, ignoring basic financial advice, were entering into mortgages
they simply could not repay. Everyone seemed to think that real estate prices would
rise forever.”).
55
Id.
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a profit and to continue issuing high-risk mortgages. To pay for the
pools of high-risk mortgages and other assets, the special purpose
57
entities began issuing mortgage-backed securities. The mortgagebacked securities were then sold both domestically and abroad, and
58
many financial institutions purchased these securities. When the
housing “bubble” burst, the default rate on the high-risk mortgages
59
rose dramatically, and the mortgage-backed securities were deva60
lued. The financial institutions that had purchased the mortgagebacked securities were no longer willing to extend credit because of
the uncertainty of the value of the mortgage-backed securities in their
61
portfolios. Because of the lack of available credit, the United States
62
economy ground to a halt. A financial crisis ensued and cascaded
63
around the rest of the world.
Many commentators focus on the housing “bubble” when discussing the causes of the financial crisis that began in 2008. Some
fault the Federal Reserve’s Federal Open Market Committee for
keeping interest rates low in the early years of the twenty-first century
because it made large amounts of credit available, which ultimately

56

See Steven L. Schwarcz, The Future of Securitization, 41 CONN. L. REV. 1313, 1316
(2009).
In the most basic form of mortgage securitization, mortgage-backed securities (MBS) are issued by a special-purpose vehicle (SPV), and payment on the securities is derived directly from collections on mortgage
loans owned by the SPV. More complex forms of mortgage-backed securities include collateralized debt obligation (CDO) securities in
which payment derives directly from a mixed pool of mortgage loans
and sometimes, also, from other financial assets owned by the SPV; and
‘ABS CDO’ securities in which payment derives from MBS and CDO
securities owned by the SPV. . . .
Id.
57
Id.
58
See generally Aaron Unterman, Exporting Risk: Global Implications of the Securitization of U.S. Housing Debt, 4 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 77 (2008).
59
See Schwarcz, supra note 55, at 1317 (explaining that the mortgage-backed securities were devalued when real estate “bubble” burst and the default rate on the
underlying mortgages increased dramatically).
60
Id.
61
See Jerry W. Markham, The Subprime Crisis—Some Thoughts on a “Sustainable” and
“Organic” Regulatory System, 4 FLA. INT’L U. L. REV. 381, 393–94 (2009) (explaining
that as a result of the devaluation of many mortgage-backed securities “[c]redit markets were frozen and liquidity became absent” because the financial institutions that
had purchased the mortgage-backed securities were unsure how to assess the mortgage-backed securities’ worth).
62
Id.
63
See id. (explaining that as a result of the credit market being frozen the United
States economy fell into recession).
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created a “bubble” in housing prices. Other commentators fault
politicians for creating the “bubble” that precipitated the financial
crisis because of government subsidies for home purchases and because of government pressure on financial institutions to grant mort65
gages to individuals who were highly unlikely to repay. Still other
observers blame the financial crisis on the financial institutions themselves and allege that the financial institutions issued high-risk mort66
gages based on both recklessness and greed. Finally, a few commentators hold no one morally accountable for the financial crisis;
instead, they blame the crisis on the perceptual failure of the individuals operating within a “bubble” to realize that the “bubble” existed
67
and would burst.
Solely focusing on the causes of the housing “bubble,” however,
ignores the role played by mortgage-backed securities in the financial
crisis. As previously explained, the financial crisis occurred because
many financial institutions had purchased mortgage-backed securities
68
that were devalued when the housing “bubble” burst. Because many
financial institutions were no longer sure of how to value the mortgage-backed securities in their portfolio, these entities stopped extending credit, and the United States economy consequentially

64

See, e.g., Robert T. Miller, Morals in a Market Bubble, 35 U. DAYTON L. REV. 113,
136 (2009) (concluding that the financial crisis “began at the Federal Reserve, where
Alan Greenspan and his colleagues on the Federal Open Market Committee made
some mistakes in the early years of this decade by keeping interest rates very low for a
very long time”).
65
See, e.g., Robert Hardaway, The Great American Housing Bubble: Re-Examining
Cause and Effect, 35 U. DAYTON L. REV 33, 59 (2009) (arguing that the best way to prevent a future housing “bubble” is by “eliminating home mortgage tax subsidies for
the richest Americans [and] repealing laws pressuring banks to extend mortgages to
marginal buyers”).
66
See, e.g., Steven A. Ramirez, Subprime Bailouts and the Predator State, 35 U. DAYTON
L. REV. 81, 84–85 (2009) (“In what can only be described as an orgy of reckless financial management, a number of very large financial firms pursued short-term profits
without regard to risks borne by their firms in one of the greatest credit bubbles in
history, starting in 2004 and continuing through 2007. Much of this excessively risky
credit found its way into the U.S. residential real estate market via subprime loans.”).
67
See, e.g., Miller, supra note 64, at 137 (“Moralizing critics blame virtually everyone involved in the housing market [for the financial crisis that began in 2008], but
in reality virtually all of these people were entirely innocent. They were trapped in a
market bubble, and certainly none of these people, whether individually or even collectively, engaged in any moral wrongdoing that caused the bubble and the burst.”).
But see Jeffrey M. Lipshaw, Disclosure and Judgment: “We Have Met Madoff and He is
Ours,” 35 U. DAYTON L. REV. 139, 144 (2009) (arguing that the financial crisis that began in 2008 resulted from failures in human judgment, rather than failures of the
laws and regulations mandating disclosure of information).
68
See supra notes 58–63 and accompanying text.
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ground to a halt. Therefore, in addressing the root causes of the financial crisis, one must also consider what went wrong with the
mortgage-backed securities.
The issues created by mortgage-backed securities resulted from
under-regulation of these securities by Congress, and, more specifically, the SEC. Remarkably, when more aggressive regulation and enforcement was needed, the SEC was taking a “hands off” approach to
institutional investors, mortgage-backed securities, and the credit rat70
ing agencies that were valuing mortgage-backed securities.
The
SEC’s “hands off” approach resulted in large part from the deregulationist movement in the United States that gained traction in the early years of the twenty-first century. As Judge Richard Posner, a major
proponent of deregulation, admits in A Failure of Capitalism: The Crisis
of ‘08 and the Descent into Depression, “[t]he movement to deregulate
the financial industry went too far by exaggerating the resilience—
71
the self-healing powers—of laissez-faire capitalism.” Put simply, the
financial crisis that began in 2008 can in large part be traced to a deregulationist movement that was too successful in advocating for a
“hands off” approach to securities regulation and enforcement.
The deregulationist movement gained traction in the early years
of the twenty-first century because the dominance of the United
States had been declining in terms of its capital markets and role as a
72
securities regulator.
International regulatory competition was
emerging as the dominant model for international securities regula73
tion, and a race-to-the-bottom was occurring as regulators ratcheted
down their levels of regulation and enforcement in hopes of attracting issuers, investors, and other market participants to their jurisdic-

69
See supra notes 61–63 and accompanying text (explaining that many financial
institutions were unwilling to extend credit when the mortgage-backed securities that
they held were devalued because the financial institutions were unsure how to assess
the mortgage-backed securities’ worth).
70
See Barbara Black, Protecting the Retail Investor in an Age of Financial Uncertainty,
35 U. DAYTON L. REV. 61, 77 (2009) (arguing that to prevent future financial crises
the United States must “get rid of the ‘hands off’ attitude toward institutional and
sophisticated investors that is ingrained into the regulatory climate”).
71
See POSNER, supra note 5, at xii.
72
See supra notes 36–37 and accompanying text (explaining that the dominance
of the United States has been waning in terms of its capital markets and its role as a
securities regulator).
73
See Chris Brummer, Stock Exchanges and the New Markets for Securities Laws, 75 U.
CHI. L. REV. 1435, 1435–36 (2008) (arguing that the emerging system of international
securities regulation is based on regulatory competition).
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tions. In the early years of the twenty-first century, no regulator
wanted to increase the level of regulation on mortgage-backed securities out of fear that it would disadvantage their nation or region from
participating in the housing “bubble” in the United States. The result, of course, was the financial crisis that began in 2008.
C. Six Possible Models for International Securities Law
The financial crisis that began in 2008 evidences the systemic
risk that is created if the world takes a regulatory competition approach to international securities law. As the financial crisis demonstrates, patchwork regulation does not provide an optimal level of
regulation for the emerging global securities markets. This reality
raises the question: What are the available approaches for international securities law? This section discusses six possible models for international securities law. These models are privatization, competition, convergence, mutual recognition, harmonization, and centrali75
centralization.
These approaches can be placed on a spectrum
based on the amount of international cooperation and coordination
that is required to bring each of them into existence and to maintain
them. On this spectrum, regulatory privatization would be at one
endpoint because it requires the least cooperation and coordination
among securities regulators, and regulatory centralization would be
at the other endpoint because it requires the most cooperation and
coordination. When traveling from regulatory privatization to centralization on this spectrum, one would pass through competition, convergence, mutual recognition, and harmonization. Obviously, these
approaches can and do overlap and blur.
Under a regulatory privatization approach, stock exchanges
would have the power to develop their own internal systems of securi-

74
See Langevoort, supra note 47, at 193 (“The global scale of the [financial crisis
that began in 2008] shows that other countries have been too lax as well, so that
there should be a ratcheting up of securities regulation not only in the United States,
but worldwide.”).
75
In my previous scholarship discussing the possible models for international securities law, I chose to omit regulatory privatization because privatization involves
regulation by non-governmental entities, rather than among nations. See Chaffee,
supra note 19, at 35–39; Chaffee, supra note 21, at 193–97. After thinking about it
more, I have opted to include a discussion of regulatory privatization in this Article
because it adds to the discussion of how the emerging global capital markets might
best be regulated. In addition, because of the rise of transnational exchanges, privatization should properly be viewed as a type of international securities law.
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ties regulation that would govern their exchanges. Issuers, investors,
and other market participants would then opt to subject themselves
to these privatized systems of securities regulation by engaging in
77
transactions on a particular exchange. Although this idea might
seem novel, the United States used this approach prior to the passage
78
of the first blue sky laws in the early 1900s. Even though regulatory
privatization was once the law of the land in the United States, reinstituting this approach either in the United States or internationally
would likely be extremely difficult because the world has grown ac79
customed to regulation on a national level by governmental entities.
A second approach to international securities regulation can be
founded on regulatory competition. Under a regulatory competition
approach, individual nations develop systems of securities regulation
and compete to attract issuers, investors, and other market partici80
pants. The world is currently transitioning to a regulatory competi81
tion approach to international securities law.
As previously discussed, for much of the twentieth century, the United States was
viewed as having the world’s premier capital markets and premier sys82
tem of securities regulation. The United States was able to serve as a
coordinating force in international securities law by exporting its
83
theories of market regulation and enforcement to other nations. As

76

See generally Paul G. Mahoney, The Exchange as Regulator, 83 VA. L. REV. 1453
(1997) (arguing that securities exchanges should be the primary source of securities
regulation).
77
Id.
78
See Howell E. Jackson, Centralization, Competition, and Privatization in Financial
Regulation, 2 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 649, 661 (2001) (“[A]dvocating the full privatization of securities regulation, would, in the United States, turn back the clock
nearly a full century, not just before the New Deal, but further back, before the
dawning of the first Blue Sky laws of the early 1900s.”).
79
See id. at 660 (describing privatization as a “radical school of thought” because
it “challenge[s] the question of whether governments should even play a role in the
development of securities regimes”).
80
See Tzung-bor Wei, The Equivalence Approach to Securities Regulation, 27 NW. J.
INT’L L. & BUS. 255, 256 (2007) (“[A]dvocates of regulatory competition assert that
countries should not restrict themselves to a one-size-fits-all approach. Different
countries should be able to enact different laws to accommodate different preferences and experiences. The regulatory competition model allows countries to tailor
their laws to country-specific circumstances.”).
81
See Brummer, supra note 73.
82
See supra note 33 and accompanying text (explaining that for much of the
twentieth century the United States was viewed as having the world’s principal capital
markets and premier system of securities regulation).
83
See supra notes 34–35 and accompanying text (arguing that because of its dominance in terms of its capital markets and system of securities regulation during the
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the dominance of the United States has begun to diminish, regulatory competition has begun to emerge as the dominant approach to in84
ternational securities law.
Consequently, nations are underregulating their securities markets in a race-to-the-bottom to attract
85
issuers, investors, and other market participants.
Regulatory convergence is a third approach to international securities regulation. Regulatory convergence can be bifurcated into
both weak and strong forms. Under a weak regulatory convergence
approach, nations naturally gravitate toward similar systems of securi86
ties regulation. If a dominant nation exists that is viewed as having
the world’s best capital markets and best system of securities law, then
this may actually lead to a race-to-the-top in which the dominant nation can pick and choose the best practices from other nations and
87
construct an optimal system of regulation and enforcement. Other
nations will then converge on the dominant nation’s system of securi88
ties regulation.
Throughout much of the twentieth century, the world took a
weak regulatory convergence approach to international securities
regulation. During this period, other nations viewed the United
States as having the world’s best capital markets and best system of
89
securities regulation. The United States was able to use its dominance to export its theories of securities regulation, and other nations
twentieth century, the United States was able to influence other nations’ and regions’
systems of securities regulation).
84
See supra notes 36–37 and accompanying text (arguing that dominance of the
United States has begun to wane in terms of its capital markets and role as a securities regulator).
85
But see Wei, supra note 80, at 256 (“[R]egulatory competition fosters innovation
because countries must compete with each other to attract market participants . . .
.”).
86
See Daniel K. Tarullo, Norms and Institutions in Global Competition Policy, 94 AM. J.
INT’L L. 478, 495 (2000) (“[The regulatory convergence] approach involves a system
of structured international activities through which national laws and regulations are
made more congruent, the enforcement of similar laws is coordinated internationally, or both. This approach may often not include a formal international agreement.
It relies instead on contact and cooperation between national regulatory officials.”).
87
See Kal Raustiala, The Architecture of International Cooperation: Transgovernmental
Networks and the Future of International Law, 43 VA. J. INT’L L. 1, 61 (2002) (“The incentives to converge regulatory policies also vary given the distribution of regulatory
power. Concentrated regulatory power can make efforts at harmonization easier,
because other jurisdictions will often have strong incentives to adopt the dominant
actor’s model.”).
88
Id.
89
See supra note 33 and accompanying text (reporting that for much of the twentieth century the United States was viewed as having the world’s premier capital markets and premier system of securities regulation).
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were willing to make their securities laws converge with those of the
90
Unites States. Although the United States continues to try to export
91
its theories of securities via the SEC, the dominance of the United
States has begun to wane, and regulatory competition has become
92
the dominant model of international securities law.
Under a strong regulatory convergence model of international
securities law, nations agree to certain regulatory norms through
93
treaties or other agreements. Nations then adopt codes of securities
regulation based on these regulatory norms, and these norms cause
the individual nations to converge upon similar systems of securities
94
regulation. Although strong regulatory convergence has never been
the dominant model for international securities law, in certain instances, nations have entered multilateral memorandums of understanding and other agreements that require the signatories to comply
with certain basic regulatory norms in regard to their systems of se95
curities regulation and enforcement.
A fourth approach to international securities law is founded on
regulatory mutual recognition. Under a regulatory mutual recognition approach, nations enter into treaties or other agreements under
which compliance with one signatory’s securities laws is viewed as be96
ing equivalent to compliance with all signatories’ securities laws.
90

See supra note 34 and accompanying text (arguing that for much of the twentieth century the United States was able to use its dominance in terms of its capital
markets and system of securities regulation to export its theories of securities regulation to other nations and regions).
91
See U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Securities and Exchange Commission’s International
Technical
Assistance
Program,
http://www.sec.gov/about/offices/oia/oia_
emergtech.shtml (last visited May 12, 2010) (describing the SEC’s international
technical assistance program, a program that is “helping improve market development and enforcement capacity around the world through its flagship International
Institutes, bilateral missions, and regional training programs”).
92
See supra note 37 and accompanying text (explaining that the United States’
ability to be a coordinating force in international securities law has waned because its
dominance in terms of its capital markets and system of securities regulation is receding); supra note 73 and accompanying text (arguing that the world is transitioning to
a regulatory competition approach to international securities regulation).
93
See Tarullo, supra note 86, at 495 (noting that under a strong regulatory convergence model, “[e]ven where formal agreements do exist, they are generally not
binding as a matter of international law, and are often tantamount to points of reference for the ongoing cooperative activities rather than a code of conduct”).
94
Id.
95
See, e.g., infra note 116 and accompanying text (discussing IOSCO’s Multilateral Memorandum of Understanding Concerning Consultation and Cooperation and
the Exchange of Information to which many nations have become signatories).
96
See Alicia Davis Evans, A Requiem for the Retail Investor?, 95 VA. L. REV. 1105, 1127
(2009) (“Under a ‘mutual recognition’ regime, certain foreign issuers would be
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For example, an issuer who registers an offering in one nation with a
mutual recognition agreement with a second nation would be free to
sell its securities in that second nation, even though the securities are
97
registered only in the first nation.
The United States has flirted with the idea of taking a mutual
recognition approach to international securities regulation. In 2007,
Ethiopis Tafara and Robert Peterson, two staff members in the SEC’s
Office of International Affairs, published A Blueprint for Cross-Border
Access to U.S. Investors: A New International Framework in the Harvard In98
ternational Law Journal. In the article Tafara and Peterson propose a
new legal framework to allow foreign financial service providers (e.g.,
foreign stock exchanges and foreign broker-dealers) to operate in the
United States based on compliance with their home country’s securi99
ties laws. To ensure that high standards of regulation would be
maintained, Tafara and Peterson propose to limit this system of substitute compliance to countries with similar regulation and enforce100
ment practices as the United States.
Initially, the SEC, under the
leadership of Chairman Christopher Cox, warmly received Tafara
and Peterson’s proposal and convened meetings regarding how the
101
proposal might be implemented. After the confirmation of Chairman Mary Schapiro in January 2009, however, the Tafara and Peter-

permitted to list their shares on U.S. exchanges and sell shares to U.S. investors without being subject to the full panoply of U.S. securities laws and regulations. These
issuers would be subject only to the laws of their home country.”).
97
Id.
98
Ethiopis Tafara & Robert J. Peterson, A Blueprint for Cross-Border Access to U.S.
Investors: A New International Framework, 48 HARV. INT’L L.J. 31 (2007).
99
See id. at 32 (“This Article proposes a new framework to apply to foreign financial service providers accessing the U.S. capital market . . . . Rather than requiring
such foreign stock exchanges and foreign broker-dealers to register with the SEC, as
is currently the case, the proposed framework relies on a system of substituted compliance with SEC regulations.”).
100
See id. (“By constructing a new model for international cooperation between
the SEC and certain like-minded foreign securities regulators, the framework will facilitate the SEC’s ability to protect U.S. investors and lead to a collaborative effort in
promoting high-quality regulatory standards in a globalized market.”).
101
See Karmel, supra note 37, at 1708–09 (“Following the publication of the Tafara
article and favorable comments upon it, the SEC held a Roundtable on Mutual Recognition. . . . Mutual recognition of foreign markets and broker-dealers was also
promoted in speeches by the Director of the Division of Market Regulation.”); Pan,
supra note 37, at 223 (“Since the publication of this proposal, SEC Chairman Christopher Cox and other senior SEC officials have openly discussed and endorsed the
merits of mutual recognition, and the SEC has held public meetings to discuss how
such a proposal should be implemented.”).

CHAFFEE_FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

1600

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

11/8/2010 3:58 PM

[Vol. 40:1581

son proposal appears to have been tabled or even outright rejected
102
by the SEC.
A fifth approach to international securities regulation is founded
on regulatory harmonization. Under a regulatory harmonization approach, nations agree via treaty or other agreement to make their se103
curities laws identical and equivalent.
Although harmonization is
very similar to a strong regulatory convergence approach, harmonization is different because strong convergence sets only basic regulatory
norms and allows the individual nations to construct their own sys104
tems of securities laws based on those norms. A harmonization approach requires that the securities laws of all signatory nations be
identical and equivalent without providing individual nations the
ability to experiment in how to achieve the norms underlying the
105
regulatory system. Regulatory harmonization can be used either to
set a floor of regulation, which allows individual nations to upwardly
depart, or it can be used to set out a comprehensive system of regula106
tion.
Finally, regulatory centralization is a sixth approach to international securities law. Under a regulatory centralization approach, nations would join together to create an international organization that
would have monitoring, regulatory, and/or enforcement responsibil107
ities relating to the emerging global capital markets. The extent of
the monitoring, regulatory, or enforcement powers of this centralized
global regulator would ultimately be determined by the nations
108
agreeing to subject themselves to its authority.
For example, this
centralized global regulator could be given solely monitoring func102

See Dan Jamieson, Schapiro Cool to ‘Mutual Recognition’ Efforts, INVESTMENT NEWS
(Feb. 1, 2009), http://www.investmentnews.com/article/20090201/REG/302019997
(“Bold efforts by the Bush administration Securities and Exchange Commission to
open the doors to foreign brokerage firms are likely to be put on hold by new
Chairman Mary Schapiro.”).
103
See Sidney A. Shapiro, International Trade Agreements, Regulatory Protection, and
Public Accountability, 54 ADMIN. L. REV. 435, 436 (2002) (“Harmonization involves the
adoption of an international standard that adjusts the regulatory standards or procedures of two or more countries until they are the same.”).
104
See Edward F. Greene, Beyond Borders Part II: A New Approach to the Regulation of
Global Securities Offerings, in FOREIGN ISSUERS & THE U.S. SECURITIES LAWS 2008:
STRATEGIES FOR THE CHANGING REGULATORY ENVIRONMENT 607, 612 (Practising Law
Inst. ed., 2008) (“Harmonization . . . addresses duplicative or overlapping regulations
by making them identical or, at the very least, consistent.”).
105
Id.
106
Id.
107
See Jackson, supra note 78, at 656–57 (explaining the regulatory centralization
approach to international securities law).
108
Id.
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tions or could be charged with creating and enforcing a baseline of
regulation from which participating nations could opt to upwardly
depart.
Although the world is transitioning to a regulatory competition
approach to international securities law, because of the increasing inability of the United States to fuel convergence of national systems of
109
securities regulation and enforcement, many nations have expressed at least a limited interest in a centralization approach to in110
ternational securities regulation.
For example, many securities
regulators engage in bilateral or multilateral dialogues with securities
regulators from other nations to promote coordination and cooperation regarding transnational securities regulation and enforcement
111
issues.
Moreover, a number of international organizations have
emerged to promote coordination and cooperation among national
112
securities regulators.
The most significant of these organizations is likely the International Organization of Securities Commissions (“IOSCO”). IOSCO
was founded in 1983 as a successor to an inter-American organization
that promoted coordination and cooperation among securities regu-

109
See supra note 73 and accompanying text (arguing that the world is transitioning to a regulatory competition approach to international securities regulation); supra note 37 (arguing that the United States’ ability to act as a coordinating force in
international securities law has begun to diminish because of its waning dominance
in terms of its capital markets and system of securities regulation).
110
See Hannah L. Buxbaum, Personal Jurisdiction over Foreign Directors in Cross-Border
Securities Litigation, 35 J. CORP. L. 71, 72 (2009) (“The regulatory community has developed a range of mechanisms that explicitly address securities fraud as a global issue. These include cooperation and coordination instruments such as bilateral memoranda of understanding between regulatory agencies, as well as the work of
multilateral organizations such as the International Organization of Securities Commissions.”).
111
See Jerry W. Markham & Daniel J. Harty, For Whom the Bell Tolls: The Demise of
Exchange Trading Floors and the Growth of ECNs, 33 J. CORP. L. 865, 928 (2008) (“In the
international arena [of financial regulation], cooperation among regulators has
evolved from bilateral agreements to multilateral agreements in the form of participation in international organizations.”); but see Aaron Unterman, Exporting Risk: Global Implications of the Securitization of U.S. Housing Debt, 4 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 77, 111
(“While a range of bilateral and multilateral agreements exist between nations they
deal mostly with issues of cross border enforcement and assistance with securities investigations. There is currently no international treaty in force which specifically focuses on the global capital market.”).
112
See Langevoort, supra note 47, at 205 (“The key to global securities regulation
in the future will be the construction of institutions to articulate world-wide standards that command legitimacy and respect. IASB is moving toward being such a
standard-setter, and the International Organization of Securities Commissions
(IOSCO) is taking shape toward being another.”).
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lators in North and South America. Currently, IOSCO’s members
regulate more than ninety percent of the world’s securities markets
114
and represent more than one hundred jurisdictions.
Throughout
IOSCO’s history, it has served as a centralizing force in international
securities law in a variety of circumstances. For example, in 1998,
IOSCO adopted an influential set of advisory standards and benchmarks for regulating securities markets, called the Objectives and
115
Principles of Securities Regulation (“Principles”).
Moreover, in
2002, IOSCO adopted a multilateral memorandum of understanding
(“Memorandum of Understanding”) designed to facilitate transnational enforcement and information sharing among securities regula116
tors throughout the world.
IOSCO, however, fails to provide the regulatory harmonization
and centralization that is necessary to regulate the emerging global
capital markets. IOSCO mainly serves coordinating and monitoring
functions, rather than being a centralized force for regulation and
117
enforcement in international securities law. In terms of regulation,
compliance with IOSCO’s Principles or Memorandum of Understanding, which IOSCO touts among its greatest successes, are volun118
tary until an individual nation chooses to adopt them. In terms of
enforcement, IOSCO’s Principles on very rare occasion have been
used publicly to identify nations with poor systems of securities regu-

113

See IOSCO Historical Background, OICV-IOSCO, http://www.iosco.org/about/
index.cfm?section=background (last visited Sept. 25, 2010) (“[IOSCO] was created
in 1983 with the decision to change from an inter-American regional association
(created in 1974) into a global cooperative body. Eleven securities regulatory agencies from North and South America took [sic] this decision in April 1983 at a meeting in Quito, Ecuador.”).
114
Id. (“Its membership regulates more than 95% of the world’s securities markets and it is the primary international cooperative forum for securities market regulatory agencies. IOSCO members are drawn from, and regulate, over 100 jurisdictions and its membership continues to grow.”).
115
INT’L ORG. OF SEC. COMM’NS, OBJECTIVES AND PRINCIPLES OF SECURITIES
ORGANIZATION (Sept. 1998), available at http://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/
pdf/IOSCOPD82.pdf.
116
INT’L ORG. OF SEC. COMM’NS, MULTILATERAL MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING
CONCERNING CONSULTATION AND COOPERATION AND THE EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION
(May
2002),
available
at
http://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/
IOSCOPD126.pdf.
117
The International Organization of Securities Commissions, OICV-IOSCO,
http://www.iosco.org/about (last visited Sept. 25, 2010) (explaining that IOSCO’s
main purposes are to coordinate among securities regulators and monitor the global
securities markets, rather than providing an independent source of regulation and
enforcement).
118
See supra notes 115–16.

CHAFFEE_FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2010]

11/8/2010 3:58 PM

FINISHING THE RACE TO THE BOTTOM

1603

lation, but beyond this type of public shaming, IOSCO lacks the pow119
er to enforce any of the standards that it establishes.
III. THE ARGUMENT FOR THE HARMONIZATION AND CENTRALIZATION
OF INTERNATIONAL SECURITIES LAW
The world should adopt an approach based on harmonization
and centralization to international securities law. Nations throughout the world should harmonize their securities laws to allow for the
creation of a centralized global securities regulator. Then, nations
should negotiate treaties and other agreements to allow a centralized
global securities regulator with robust monitoring, regulatory, and
enforcement powers to come into being. The centralized global securities regulator should then set a baseline of securities regulation
from which nations can choose to upwardly depart, if they desire. Although this approach may seem drastic and unrealistic based on the
current global political climate and the probable unwillingness of
120
most regulators to cede power, a harmonized and centralized system of international securities regulation offers the best approach to
international securities law because it would minimize systemic risk,
increase efficiency of the emerging global capital markets, and pool
the expertise and experience of the world’s securities regulators.
A. Harmonization and Centralization of International Securities Law
Minimize Risk in the Emerging Global Capital Markets
The emergence of global capital markets has caused the emergence of global systemic risk. Global capital markets offer a variety of
benefits. Investors are afforded breadth and depth of investment op121
portunities and new options for portfolio diversification.
Issuers
can seek capital from a wider variety of sources, and the amount of

119

See Chris Brummer, Post-American Securities Regulation, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 327,
340–41 (2010) (“Noncompliance with IOSCO rules is not generally met with any retaliation, though it has led to overt economic sanctions in one context. In 2000 and
2001, international authorities publicly identified twenty-three countries as having
poor regulatory governance, due in part to their nonobservance of IOSCO standards.”).
120
See Langevoort, supra note 47, at 205 (arguing that “we will not see a global securities and financial services regulator—something as dramatic as a Global Financial
Services Commission—anytime soon”).
121
See Madison & Greene, supra note 34, at 99 (“The rapid pace of technological
advances is bringing us closer to the reality of a seamless global capital market. In
such a world, investors would have access to increased liquidity, greater diversification, and a wider range of investment options regardless of their location.”).
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capital available is greater. In addition, broker-dealers, investment
advisors, and other market participants can make additional profits
123
by providing new services. Despite all of these benefits, the globalization of capital markets also creates additional global systemic risks.
As the financial world has become more interconnected, financial
crises are more likely to be global events, rather than national or re124
gional occurrences.
Harmonization and centralization of international securities law helps to reduce systemic risk because it ends the
race-to-the-bottom that is occurring in international securities regulation, provides a seamless system of regulation that prevents regulatory
and enforcement gaps, and reduces spillover risks from regional or
national financial crises.
A harmonization and centralization approach to international
securities regulation will end the race-to-the-bottom in international
securities law. The financial crisis that began in 2008 occurred in
part because no nation wanted to ratchet up the level of regulation
on the mortgage-backed securities that were at the heart of the cri125
sis. The United States did not want to increase the level of regulation out of fear that it would impact the prosperity that it was experiencing and that it would render it less competitive in the emerging
126
global capital markets. Other nations did not increase the level of
regulation on mortgage-backed securities out of fear that it would
render their nations less competitive because they would be unable to
127
receive the benefits of the United States’ prosperity. A harmonized
and centralized approach to international securities regulation would
end the race-to-the-bottom because it would create a centralized
global securities regulator to create a baseline of regulation and en-

122

See Steven M. Davidoff, Regulating Listings in a Global Market, 86 N.C. L. REV. 89,
90–91 (2007) (“Finance is now global. The halcyon days when the U.S. capital markets were the primary place to raise capital and list securities are over. Non-U.S. capital markets have matured; issuers have increasing latitude and choice as to where
they list and obtain capital. They have exercised this freedom with a vengeance.”).
123
See RICHARD DALE, RISK AND REGULATION IN GLOBAL SECURITIES MARKETS 1
(1996) (“Within the past two decades international financial markets have been
transformed by three key developments: globalization of the financial services industry; functional integration of banking and securities business; and financial innovation, particularly in the derivative product area.”).
124
See Karmel, supra note 30, at 33 (“Stock market crashes and financial firm failures have become international, just like trading markets.”).
125
See supra Part II.B (discussing the relationship between international securities
regulation and the Great Recession and crediting the Great Recession to a race-tothe-bottom in international securities law).
126
See supra Part II.B.
127
See supra Part II.B.
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forcement. A floor of regulation and enforcement would be set, and
nations and regions could not adopt a level of regulation below it.
Harmonization and centralization also minimize global systemic
risk because they create a seamless system of regulation that eliminates the regulatory and enforcement gaps that exist under all other
approaches to international securities law. As previously explained,
128
the world is transitioning to global capital markets. Although these
capital markets are far from seamless because of the barriers created
by the current patchwork of national and regional regulation, the
emerging global capital markets are sufficiently international that a
seamless system of regulation is needed to eliminate the regulatory
and enforcement gaps created by the current patchwork of regula129
tion.
The other approaches to international securities regulation
discussed earlier in this Article all involve some degree of regulatory
fragmentation, which permits regulatory and enforcement gaps to ex130
ist. A harmonized and centralized approach to international securities law would provide the type of seamless regulation necessary to
eliminate regulatory and enforcement gaps because a centralized
global securities regulator would be charged with robust monitoring,
enforcement, and regulatory powers to prevent such gaps.
In addition, a harmonized and centralized system provides the
type of seamless regulation necessary to prevent the collective action
problems that exist under other approaches to international securities law. Regulatory fragmentation invites free rider problems in
which nations purposefully fail to invest adequate money and resources in regulation and enforcement in the hope that other nations
131
will address problems that arise. Furthermore, other models of international securities regulation can create a bystander effect in
which nations witnessing the same problem fail to act because they
132
assume that some other nation will deal with the issue. A harmoni128

See supra Part II.A (discussing the transition from national or regional capital
markets to global capital markets).
129
See Tafara & Peterson, supra note 98, at 32 (“[T]he current international environment has enforcement and oversight gaps that present risks that do not exist in a
domestic context.”).
130
See supra Part II.C (discussing six possible models for international securities
law).
131
See Langevoort, supra note 47, at 204 (“When trading is heavily fragmented, no
nation is able to capture enough of the benefits from investments in quality regulation. It is a classic free rider problem.”); see also Jackson, supra note 33, at 115 (“As it
turns out, countries with quite similar regulatory systems may expend very different
amounts of resources on supervisory oversight [of their securities markets].”).
132
See Damien Schiff, Samaritans: Good, Bad and Ugly: A Comparative Law Analysis,
11 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 77, 112 (2005) (explaining that the bystander effect
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zation and centralization approach to international securities law
would remedy these and other collective issues because it would
create a centralized global securities regulator that would serve as a
focal point for action on monitoring, regulation, and enforcement.
Harmonization and centralization of international securities law
also helps to minimize global systemic risk because it reduces spillover risks from regional or national financial crises. Because capital
133
markets are global, any future financial crisis is likely to be global as
134
well.
Issues in national or regional markets can quickly and easily
135
spill into other nations and regions. The creation of a centralized
global securities regulator would reduce this risk because such a regulator would provide an additional layer of monitoring, regulation,
and enforcement that would help to prevent or lessen the impact of
any national or regional financial crisis.
B. Harmonization and Centralization of International Securities Law
Increase Market Efficiency
Obtaining an optimal level of regulation involves not only reduc136
ing systemic risk but also considerations of market efficiency.
A
market can be regulated in a manner that almost completely eliminates systemic risk but creates a level of regulation that is so onerous
137
and inefficient that no one will want to participate in that market.

occurs in situations in which “[r]esponsibility for affirmative conduct is perceived as
diffused among all present; fear of being reproved by others or of impeding a better
rescuer discourages rescue activity from individuals within a bystander group”); Elizabeth C. Tippett, The Promise of Compelled Whistleblowing: What the Corporate Governance
Provisions of Oxley Mean for Employment Law, 11 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 1 (2007) (describing the bystander effect as “where groups fail to act in emergencies because individuals assume that others will intervene or that others are failing to act because
the situation does not merit attention”).
133
See supra Part II.A (explaining that capital markets have transitioned from being national or regional in nature to being global).
134
See supra note 124 and accompanying text (suggesting that globalization of capital markets creates increased risk that financial crises will be global events, rather
than national or regional occurrences).
135
See Jackson, supra note 33, at 112 (“An interesting challenge in the regulation
of foreign investments is the possibility of spillover effects in the United States when
things go wrong overseas, like the Parmalat scandal on the Asian financial crisis of
1997.”).
136
See Vern R. Walker, Risk Regulation and the “Faces” of Uncertainty, 9 RISK 27, 38
(1998) (“Risk regulation is, in the end, regulation, and the optimal combination of
effectiveness, efficiency and equity is all we can ever hope to achieve.”).
137
See Rodney A. Smolla, Contemplating the Meaning of “The Rule of Law”, 42 U.
RICH. L. REV. 1, 6 (2007) (“Over-regulation of economic markets acts as a drag on
investment and entrepreneurial enterprise; over-regulation of political systems inter-
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A harmonization and centralization approach to international securities regulation would increase market efficiency over the current approach to international securities law, which is based on regulatory
competition, because it would reduce transaction costs, remove barriers to efficiency, and increase investor confidence.
Harmonization and centralization of international securities law
would reduce a variety of transaction costs created by the current system of regulatory competition. Under the current system, issuers
must pay the initial costs of determining which national regulatory
regimes apply to their offerings and under which national regulatory
138
regimes it would be most beneficial to issue securities. Then, issuers must pay the costs of complying with the registration and antifraud provisions in each nation in which they choose to make an of139
fering.
Similarly, broker-dealers, investment advisors, and other
market intermediaries must pay the cost of complying with the law in
each nation in which they choose to operate. The costs of issuers,
broker-dealers, investment advisors, and other market intermediaries
140
are then passed along to investors.
Additionally, investors must
bear information gathering costs that are created by operating within
a regulatory system in which different nations require different levels
of disclosure and have varying definitions of what constitutes securi-

feres with democracy and discourages civic participation; over-regulation of the marketplace of ideas stifles creativity and discovery in the arts and sciences.”).
138
See Jackson, supra note 33, at 118 (“To date, most economic research on globalization of capital markets has explored the benefits of cross-border financings to issuers. Hence, a common measure of the benefits of globalization is the reduction in
cost of capital for issuers.”).
139
Greene, supra note 36, at 88 (noting that one of the benefits of breaking down
regulatory barriers between nations is that “[i]ssuers, both within and outside the
United States, will gain access to a wider pool of investors and benefit from a reduced
cost of capital”).
140
See Greene, supra note 36, at 88 (“Breaking down the barriers between U.S.
financial markets and comparably regulated non-U.S. financial markets will benefit
both U.S. and non-U.S. market participants. U.S. investors will benefit from more
efficient execution of transactions in non-U.S. securities. Non-U.S. investors will similarly benefit from more efficient execution of transactions in U.S. securities.”); Tafara & Peterson, supra note 98, at 48.
U.S. investors are free to purchase such securities on foreign stock exchanges, and many do. Indeed, over the past two years, U.S. retail investment abroad has surged dramatically, mostly as a result of investors
seeking higher overseas returns made possible by the devaluation of
the U.S. dollar. However, the process can be cumbersome and comparatively expensive.
Id.
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ties fraud. Investors also have the added costs of determining what
restrictions are placed upon the resale of any securities that they pur142
chase. Finally, the current system of regulatory competition places
an added financial burden on regulators who must engage in transnational monitoring of fraud, which is made more difficult by the
143
current system of regulatory fragmentation.
A harmonization and
centralization approach to international securities law eliminates or
reduces all of these costs by creating a standardized, cohesive system
of regulation that does not vary from nation to nation (i.e., market
participants must comply with only one standard).
Transitioning to a harmonization and centralization approach to
international securities regulation also increases market efficiency by
removing barriers to the free flow of capital. As previously explained,
144
capital markets have become global. This does not mean, however,
that these capital markets are seamless and that capital can flow freely
145
The world saw the birth of
and efficiently throughout the world.
the first transnational stock exchange with the completion of the
merger between the New York Stock Exchange and Euronext on
146
April 4, 2007, and this merger has created a push for stock ex147
change consolidation throughout the world. Securities regulation,
however, remains set at a national or regional level, creating barriers
141

See Jackson, supra note 33, at 111 (“Aside from technical barriers, U.S. retail
investors face serious problems receiving information about foreign investment opportunities. Most notably, foreign broker-dealers are prohibited from soliciting most
U.S. retail investors unless those firms comply with SEC registration and compliance
requirements.”).
142
See generally Kenneth B. Davis, Jr., The SEC and Foreign Companies—A Balance of
Competing Interest, 71 U. PITT. L. REV. 457 (2010) (discussing the rules placed upon
foreign companies wishing to raise capital in the United States, including restrictions
that are placed upon investors who purchase and want to resell their securities).
143
See Greene, supra note 36, at 86 (“The SEC must find a way to work with its
counterparts outside the United States to eliminate barriers to cross-border investment. . . . The current U.S. regulatory scheme makes cross-border investment costly
and inefficient.”).
144
See supra Part II.A (analyzing the transition from national or regional capital
markets to global capital markets).
145
See Greene, supra note 36, at 97 (“The SEC must acknowledge that the securities markets have evolved beyond jurisdictional borders and that its current regulatory regime has resulted in barriers to competition and placed roadblocks in the way of
investor access to cross-border investment opportunities that have contributed to increased costs and market inefficiencies.”).
146
See supra note 45 and accompanying text (discussing the merger between the
New York Stock Exchange and Euronext).
147
See supra notes 44–46 (discussing the push for stock exchange consolidation
throughout the world that was touched off by the New York Stock Exchange and Euronext merger).
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to the seamless operation of these newly emerging transnational ex148
changes. In the absence of harmonization and centralization of international securities regulation, the emerging global securities markets will operate less efficiently because of the barriers created by
149
having to comply with fragmented national securities regulation.
Transitioning to a harmonization and centralization approach to
international securities regulation also increases market efficiency
because it increases investor confidence, which yields both market
participation and market stability. One of the key requirements for
creating an efficient market for securities is having a large number of
150
market participants.
Investor confidence is important because investors will not invest in a market, or hold the securities that they do
purchase for a long period of time, if they believe that they have inadequate information or that they are going to be the victim of
151
fraud. The current system of international securities regulation engenders such negative beliefs because regulatory competition makes
148

See Pan, supra note 39, at 137 (“The utmost economic benefits of the [New
York Stock Exchange and Euronext] merger will be realized only if the exchanges
are able to consolidate trading into one platform with a single order book, thereby
achieving economies of scale and maximizing liquidity.”).
149
See Susanne Kalss, Recent Development in Liability for Nondisclosure of Capital Market
Information, 27 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 70, 76 (2007) (“The benefit of centralising
fragmented supervisory powers for the securities markets lie in improving cost efficiency for the benefit of the supervised institutions as well as for consumers of financial services.”); Tafara & Peterson, supra note 98, at 32 (“Our markets are now interconnected and viewing them in isolation—as we have for so long—is no longer the
best approach to protecting our investors, promoting an efficient and transparent
U.S. market, or facilitating capital formation for U.S. issuers.”).
150
See Tafara & Peterson, supra note 98, at 46 (“An efficient capital market also
requires a degree of egalitarianism and blindness to national origin. Ceteris paribus,
the larger the pool of investors bidding on a company’s securities, the more efficiently the price of those securities will be set and the more liquid the market for them
will be.”).
151
See Bernard S. Black, The Legal and Institutional Preconditions for Strong Securities
Markets, 48 UCLA L. REV. 781, 783 (2001) (“[T]here are two essential prerequisites
for strong public securities markets. A country’s laws and related institutions must
give minority shareholders: (1) good information about the value of a company’s
business; and (2) confidence that the company’s insiders (its managers and controlling shareholders) won’t cheat investors out of most or all of the value of their investment through ‘self-dealing’ transactions (transactions between a company and its
insiders or another firm that the insiders control) or even outright theft.”); see also
Troy A. Paredes, On the Decision to Regulate Hedge Funds: The SEC’s Regulatory Philosophy,
Style, and Mission, 2006 U. ILL. L. REV. 975, 999 (2006) (“The logic of federal securities regulation . . . is that the mandatory disclosure regime of the federal securities
laws shores up investor confidence and the integrity of securities markets by redressing information asymmetries and targeting fraud. Mandatory disclosure and federal
antifraud provisions, in the conventional view, encourage investors to invest, leading
to more efficient and more highly valued securities markets.”).
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information gathering more difficult, creates a fragmented system
153
of regulation that is difficult to understand, and suggests that regulators are going to ratchet down their systems of regulation to attract
154
issuers.
A harmonization and centralization approach to international securities regulation increases investor confidence by making
information gathering easier, creating a simpler system of regulation,
and preventing regulators from ratcheting down their systems of regulation to attract issuers because such an approach creates a single,
uniform system regulation on a global basis.
C. Harmonization and Centralization of International Securities Law
Pool the Expertise and Experience of the World’s Securities
Regulators
A regulatory competition approach to international securities
law creates tension among regulators to attract issuers, investors, and
155
other market participants to their particular nation or region.
Although most nations have shown a willingness to participate in international organizations that encourage coordination and cooperation
156
among securities regulators (e.g., IOSCO), a regulatory competition approach to international securities law necessarily creates some
157
reluctance to share technical information. Even if a nation engages
in a robust exchange of technical information, this does not guaran152
See supra note 141 and accompanying text (explaining that the current patchwork of national securities regulation makes information gathering in emerging
global capital markets more difficult).
153
See Karmel, supra note 30, at 39 (“In globalized capital markets, many violations
of securities laws are transnational. This means that unless national laws are given
extraterritorial effect, there will be inadequate law enforcement, but if laws are applied extraterritorially, there will be conflict between regulators and confusion on
the part of regulated persons as to what are the proper rules.”).
154
See Pan, supra note 37, at 235 (noting the concern “that any difference in regulatory standards between the United States and the foreign jurisdiction will give rise
to regulatory arbitrage. Less rigorous foreign regulation will favor foreign exchanges
and broker-dealers over U.S. exchanges and broker-dealers and encourage U.S. market participants to establish operations abroad to take advantage of the regulatory
differences.”).
155
See supra notes 80–85 and accompanying text (defining and discussing a regulatory competition approach to international securities law).
156
See supra notes 113–19 (providing an overview of IOSCO and its activities).
157
See Lawrence A. Cunningham & David Zaring, The Three or Four Approaches to
Financial Regulation: A Cautionary Analysis Against Exuberance in Crisis Response, 78 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 39, 107 (2009) (“There is ongoing and increasing regulatory competition among national securities regulators, operating in part and indirectly through
their stock exchanges. That competition is mediated, but only slightly, by efforts to
harmonize regulation that the International Organization of Securities Commissions
and entities like it have made.”).
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tee that the rest of the world will pay attention. For example, the
United States engages in vigorous efforts to share its expertise and
158
experience through its Technical Assistance Program, and a race-tothe-bottom has still emerged because the United States has become
less able to fuel regulatory convergence in terms of international se159
curities regulation.
Harmonization and centralization of international securities law is beneficial because it pools the expertise and
experience of the world’s securities regulators. Although a centralized global securities regulator would have to be structured in such a
way to allow for the effective pooling of technical information, a
harmonization and centralization approach offers the best opportunity for sharing the expertise and experience of the United States,
the European Union, and the rest of the world.
Although the dominance of the United States is waning in terms
160
of its capital markets and its role as a securities regulator, the United States has a wealth of expertise and experience to offer the rest of
the world. The United States entered the twentieth century with a
privatized system of securities regulation under which securities exchanges determined the rules governing issuers, investors, and mar161
ket participants. When this approach proved ineffective to prevent
fraud, states began adopting securities statutes, which are commonly
162
referred to as “blue sky laws.” This model of regulatory competition
persisted throughout the 1910s and 1920s until the patchwork of
regulation created by the blue sky laws proved ineffective to prevent

158
Securities and Exchange Commission’s International Technical Assistance
SEC.
&
EXCH.
COMM’N,
Program,
U.S.
http://www.sec.gov/about/offices/oia/oia_emergtech.shtml (last visited July 8,
2010) (providing an overview of the SEC’s Technical Assistance Program, which
“provides training to nearly 2000 regulatory and law enforcement officials from over
100 countries”).
159
See supra notes 36–37 and accompanying text (explaining that the role of the
United States as a security regulator and its ability to serve as a coordinating force in
international securities law has been waning).
160
See supra notes 36–37 and accompanying text (explaining that the dominance
of the United States in terms of its capital markets and role as a securities regulator is
waning as global capital markets have begun to emerge).
161
See supra note 78 and accompanying text (reporting that prior to the adoption
of state codes of securities regulation in the 1910s and the 1920s, the United States
employed a privatized system of securities regulation in which the securities exchanges were the primary sources of regulation of market participants).
162
See THOMAS LEE HAZEN, THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION 18–19 (6th ed.
2009) (providing an overview of the adoption of state codes of securities regulation
in the 1910s and 1920s in the United States).
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the stock market crash of 1929 and the Great Depression. With the
164
enactment of the Securities Act of 1933
and the Securities Ex165
change Act of 1934, the United States adopted a centralized approach to domestic securities law. Section 4(a) of the 1934 Act
created the SEC to serve as a centralized regulatory body within this
166
new regulatory system. As a result of this centralized approach, the
securities markets in the United States remained relatively stable until
a patchwork of regulation created a race-to-the-bottom on the inter167
national level. Based on this history, the United States has a wealth
of information to offer to the rest of the world, including expertise
and experience regarding transitioning between regulatory models
and maintaining relatively stable securities markets under a regulatory centralization model.
Under a harmonization and centralization approach to international securities law, the European Union also can offer a wealth of
technical information to the world. Europe spent most of the twen-

163

See id. at 18 (“Following the enactment of the early state securities laws, federal
legislation was successfully resisted for a while. However, the stock market crash of
1929 is properly described as the straw that broke the camel’s back. The era that followed ushered in federal securities regulation.”); see also Eric C. Chaffee, Standing
Under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5: The Continued Validity of the Forced Seller Exception to
the Purchaser-Seller Requirement, 11 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 843, 851 (2009) (reporting that the
“inconsistent patchwork of securities regulation” created by the blue sky laws had
been “largely ineffective in preventing fraud”).
164
Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a–77aa (2006).
165
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a–78nn (2006).
166
Id. § 78d(a) (providing for the establishment of the United States Securities
and Exchange Commission).
167
See John M. Fedders, Policing Trans-Border Fraud in the United States Securities
Markets: The “Waiver by Conduct” Concept—A Possible Alternative or a Starting Point for
Discussions?, 11 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 477, 504–05 n.50 (1985).
[P]articipation in the United States securities markets from a foreign
country is a direct and intentional act to take advantage of the speed,
fairness, stability, and liquidity of the American markets. . . . The effort
to preserve the American securities markets springs from a genuine
concern for the regulation and integrity of a finite and specific marketplace.
Id.; see also Eric C. Chaffee, Beyond Blue Chip: Issuer Standing to Seek Injunctive Relief Under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 Without the Purchase or Sale of Security, 36 SETON HALL L.
REV. 1135, 1139 (2006) (explaining that Congress enacted the Securities Act and the
Exchange Act in part to provide for the stability of the national capital markets and
to prevent “national emergencies created by unreasonable fluctuations in security
prices”); James D. Cox, Choice of Law Rules for International Securities Transactions?, 66
U. CIN. L. REV. 1179, 1187 (1998) (“The U.S. securities laws were enacted in the aftermath of the Great Depression and their history and content were much influenced by our experience and faith that fair and orderly markets are a cornerstone
for not just economic stability, but social stability.”).
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tieth century with a number of discrete national securities markets.
In 1957, the Treaty Establishing the European Community (“EC
Treaty”) helped form the European Communities, which is the pre169
decessor to the European Union. One of the stated goals of the EC
170
Treaty was the development of common capital markets.
During
the following decades, the European Union adopted various directives that required its member nations to harmonize their securities
171
laws. In June 2001, the European Commission opted to create the
Committee of European Securities Regulators (“CESR”) to oversee
172
the securities markets in the European Union. As a result of the financial crisis that began in 2008, a proposal has been made to replace CESR with the European Securities and Markets Authority, an
entity with more robust monitoring, regulatory, and enforcement
173
powers. Because of this history, the European Union has a variety
of expertise and experience to offer the world, which includes insights on the process of transitioning to a harmonized and centralized regulatory model, the use of directives to harmonize national
securities laws, and the need for a centralized securities regulator.
Finally, the creation of a harmonized and centralized system of
international securities law would allow for the pooling and sharing
of the expertise and experience of those regulating the emerging
global capital markets. Strong markets have begun to develop in

168

See Langevoort, supra note 47, at 194.
The United States gained an extraordinary advantage in the aftermath
of World War II because its capital markets and economic infrastructure were undamaged, while Europe and Japan had to rebuild out of
devastation. . . . That did not change appreciably until the 1980s, at
which point a growing number of countries—the United Kingdom in
particular—made very deliberate efforts to open their financial markets and compete with the United States.

Id.
169

Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 298
U.N.T.S. 11.
170
Id. at art. 3(c) (providing that one of the goals of ratifying the EC Treaty was
“the abolition, as between Member States, of the obstacles to the free movement of
persons, services, and capital”).
171
See Karmel, supra note 30, at 14 (“The mechanism chosen for integration of the
financial markets [in the European Union] was a series of directives to harmonize
essential standards throughout the EU and to enable financial regulators to practice
home country control, but oblige them to honor principles of mutual recognition.”).
172
Commission Decision 2001/527, 2001 O.J. (L 191) 43 (EC) (approving the
creation of the Committee of European Securities Regulators to oversee the capital
market created by the member states of the European Union).
173
Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council Establishing a
European Securities and Markets Authority, COM (2009) 503 final (Sept. 23, 2009).
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Asia, Europe, and South America. The experiences of regulators in
these emerging markets are as important to understand as the experiences of regulators in the United States and European Union. Cap175
ital markets have become global. The components of these global
capital markets, however, continue to develop. Understanding the
experiences of recently developed national securities markets gives
insight as to how the global capital markets will develop in the future.
IV. THE ARGUMENT AGAINST THE HARMONIZATION AND
CENTRALIZATION OF INTERNATIONAL SECURITIES LAW
Although a strong case exists for the harmonization and centralization of international securities law, critics have posited a number
of arguments against harmonization and centralization. These arguments against harmonization and centralization are usually based
on claims that such an approach to international securities law prevents the benefits of regulatory competition, is impossible to implement, and results in an unwanted loss of autonomy for the United
States. Although each of these arguments has some validity, the case
for harmonization and centralization outweighs all of the arguments
against it.
Many opponents of a model of international securities law based
on harmonization and centralization argue that such an approach
176
prevents the benefits of regulatory competition.
These opponents
claim that such an approach to international securities law creates a
suboptimal regulatory regime because a harmonization and centralization approach hinders regulatory innovation and prevents a raceto-the-top as national regulators compete to attract issuers, investors,
177
and other market participants.
For a variety of reasons, the benefits of regulatory competition
are offset by its harms. First, even if regulatory competition encou174

See supra notes 47–49 and accompanying text (reporting that capital markets in
Asia, Europe, and South America have grown in both size and sophistication, including the development of strong markets in Brazil, Russia, India, and China, which are
commonly referred to as the “BRIC” nations).
175
See supra Part II.A (explaining that capital markets are transitioning from being
national or regional in nature to being global).
176
See generally Roberta Romano, The Need for Competition in International Securities
Regulation, 2 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES IN LAW 387 (2001) (arguing that regulatory
competition is desirable over a uniform international regulatory scheme); Roberta
Romano, Empowering Investors: A Market Approach to Securities Regulation, 107 YALE L.J.
2359 (1998) (arguing for “competitive federalism” as a system of securities regulation).
177
See supra note 85 (suggesting that regulatory competition results in innovation
because regulators must compete to attract market participants).
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rages innovation that fuels market efficiency in the emerging global
capital markets, the regulatory fragmentation that results adds trans178
action costs that likely offset any benefits of that innovation.
Second, arguments in favor of regulatory competition ignore that issuers serve as a check on over regulation because of the ability of
corporations and other business entities to influence the political
179
process. Therefore, the tensions that exist under a regulatory competition model may not be necessary to create an optimal regulatory
regime because issuers are able to create the necessary tension.
Third, regulatory harmonization and centralization do not necessarily prevent regulatory competition if the centralized regulator creates
a floor from which regulators can choose to upwardly depart, if they
180
desire.
Fourth, as the Great Depression and Great Recession evidence, regulatory competition and the patchwork of regulation that
181
it generates produce a suboptimal level of regulation.
Another common argument against the harmonization and centralization of international securities law is that such an approach is
impossible to implement. This argument is usually founded on
182
claims that securities regulators are unwilling to cede power and
that the theories of securities regulation vary too greatly throughout
183
the world to allow for harmonization and centralization.
178

See supra notes 138–143 and accompanying text (discussing the added transaction costs that are created by the current model of international securities law, which
is based upon regulatory competition).
179
See Black, supra note 70, at 77 (“[W]e need never worry about over-regulation;
business interests have many well-funded and effective lobbyists, including the securities and accounting industries, small business, and the U.S. Chamber of Commerce,
to make sure that this does not happen.”).
180
See Jenah, supra note 30, at 77 (arguing that the “challenge [in international
securities regulation] . . . is to strike the right balance between a healthy degree of
regulatory competition and proverbial ‘race to the bottom.’”).
181
See supra notes 162–163 (arguing that the patchwork of regulation that existed
in the United States prior to the stock market crash of 1929 and ensuing depression
was ineffective in regulating the national capital markets in the United States); see
also supra notes 10–12 and accompanying text (arguing that the financial downturn
that began in 2008 resulted because the patchwork of national securities regulation
that existed at the time was ineffective in regulating the emerging global capital markets).
182
See Pan, supra note 37, at 236 (“Foreign jurisdictions historically have expressed
hostility to any extension of U.S. trading and liability standards to their markets, and
the SEC has expressed skepticism about the standards of the most prominent foreign
exchanges.”).
183
See Langevoort, supra note 47, at 204.
[The system of securities regulation in the United States] has been
built over the last seventy-five years largely to promote the interests of
retail investors, and the political demand for regulatory responses after
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Although a model of international securities law based on har184
monization and centralization is likely unrealistic in the short-term,
such an approach makes sense in the long-term. In recent years, the
world’s securities markets have transitioned from being national or
185
regional in nature to being global. The implications of this transition are still being worked out, including issues of how to regulate the
emerging global securities markets. Arguing that the world has to retain a system of securities regulation based on national or regional
regulation ignores the fact that regulatory regimes ultimately can and
should evolve in response to the subject matter that they regulate.
In addition, financial crises fuel evolution in securities regula186
tion.
As evidenced by the financial crisis that began in 2008, patchwork regulation does not work to regulate the emerging global se187
curities markets.
Even if the financial crisis does not fuel a leap
toward harmonization and centralization, the crisis still created a
push for greater coordination and cooperation among the world’s
188
securities regulators. The development of harmonization and cen-

every financial scandal reminds us of this. But globally, few if any other
countries have a similarly retail-driven approach. Both markets and
regulation in the rest of the world have been built for institutional investors better able to fend for themselves, and have a lighter touch for
that reason.
Id.; see Madison & Greene, supra note 34, at 100 (“[A]s a result of both historical and
cultural influences, other countries may still have differing standards for disclosure
that are either less stringent or based on different assumptions than those found in
the U.S. markets. For example, some foreign markets may have different cultural or
legal views towards insider trading.”); Pan, supra note 39, at 137 (“The U.S. regulatory regime tightly controls how exchanges operate, who can conduct business on the
exchanges and what are the responsibilities of exchanges to regulate market participants. Unique to the U.S. system, these regulations cannot easily be extended to
non-U.S. exchanges.”).
184
See supra note 120 (explaining that the creation of a centralized global securities regulator is likely impracticable in the short term).
185
See supra Part II.A (discussing the reasons that capital markets have transitioned from being national or regional in nature to being global).
186
See DeLaMater, supra note 33, at 119 (“History has shown that we go through
periods of boom followed by bust, with the bust followed by increased regulation . . .
regulators are persuaded to accommodate various practices and the economy and
capital markets enter another period of boom. The cycle repeats.”); Tafara & Peterson, supra note 98, at 51 (“The history of financial legislation, from the Bubble Act of
1720 to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, shows that it is usually the child of crisis.”).
187
See Langevoort, supra note 47, at 205 (arguing that the financial crisis that began in 2008 is a “dramatic example” of the consequences of the “absence of collective action” in international securities regulation).
188
See Karmel, supra note 37, at 1711 (“Current market turmoil caused by the subprime mortgage crisis and other events is . . . a dynamic which leads to regulatory
reform. Open questions include what kind of reform will result from this collapse of
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tralization in international securities law is likely going to have to be
an evolutionary process that occurs over the course of decades
through numerous successor entities with each having greater power
189
until true harmonization and centralization is achieved.
Even if
harmonization and centralization is not feasible in the short-term, securities regulators should still work toward it in the long-term be190
cause it affords the best solution to international securities law.
Lastly, some argue that a harmonization and centralization
model would result in an unnecessary loss of autonomy for the Unit191
ed States.
Obviously, this argument is commonly made by proponents of the continued dominance of the United States as a securities
regulator. Such an argument, however, ignores the fact that the dominance of the United States is waning both in terms of its capital
192
markets and its role as a securities regulator. Although the creation
of a centralized global regulator would require that the United States
cede some of its power, the United States has incentive to work quickly toward the creation of a global securities regulator because if it
works quickly, it can work from a position of power, rather than simply being another actor in the process. The United States has to acknowledge that the world is changing, and the best result for the
United States would be for it to work toward a harmonized and centralized system of securities regulation in which it maintains a significant or dominant role. The United States has more to risk by waiting
to act because its dominance continues to fade.
confidence in the markets and whether the SEC or the EU will drive any reform
agenda.”).
189
See Langevoort, supra note 47, at 205 (“Even in the face of crisis and scandal,
we will not see a global securities and financial services regulator—something as
dramatic as a Global Financial Services Commission—anytime soon. But we may well
see joint task forces wherein regulatory personnel from various countries are detailed
to a central location to coordinate enforcement efforts aimed at some kind of threat,
and if that becomes routine, there will be further small steps toward a permanent
regulatory institution, until it already exists de facto and is less threatening politically.”).
190
See supra Part III (explaining why a model based on harmonization and centralization offers the best approach to international securities law).
191
See also Chris Brummer, How International Financial Law Works (and How It
L.J.
(forthcoming
2011),
available
at
Doesn’t),
GEO.
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1542829 (“The establishment
of a global authority [in international securities regulation] would require countries
to delegate authority to a supranational authority . . . . It is, however, unlikely that the
legislatures of most countries would agree to such an infringement on their domestic
powers of policymaking and governance, especially with regards to large domestic
financial institutions and firms.”).
192
See supra notes 36–37 (explaining that the dominance of the United States continues to wane in terms of its capital markets and role as a securities regulator).

CHAFFEE_FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

1618

11/8/2010 3:58 PM

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 40:1581

V. CONCLUSION
As explained in the introduction of this Article, the United
States government has recognized that patchwork regulation will not
193
work effectively to regulate the emerging global securities markets.
Yet, despite the promise of a new foundation for financial supervision
194
and regulation, the United States and the world’s other securities
regulators have left in place the cracked and fragmented foundation
195
that was in place prior to the financial crisis that began in 2008.
Ideally, the world should adopt the same approach that the
United States adopted in the wake of the stock market crash of 1929
and pursue a path of harmonization and centralization in interna196
tional securities law. Nations throughout the world should harmonize their systems of securities regulation to allow for the existence of a
centralized global securities regulator, and then, the nations should
work together to bring into existence such a regulator. The regulator
should have robust monitoring, regulatory, and enforcement powers
and should set a baseline of securities regulation from which nations
could choose to upwardly depart, if they desire. Such a model based
on harmonization and centralization would have a variety of benefits,
including helping to stabilize the emerging global securities mar197
198
ket, assisting market participants, and pooling the expertise and
199
Although such a
experience of the world’s securities regulators.
193
See supra note 10 and accompanying text (reporting that “financial stress can
spread easily and quickly across national boundaries”).
194
See U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, supra note 1 (describing the Obama Administration’s and the United States Department of Treasury’s promise to “build a new foundation for financial regulation and supervision”).
195
See supra notes 15–18 and accompanying text (explaining that the United
States government does not appear to be concentrating on meaningful change to
international securities regulation).
196
See supra notes 162–167 and accompanying text (describing the evolution of
securities regulation in the United States and explaining that the United States
adopted a harmonized and centralized system of federal securities regulation as a
result of the stock market crash of 1929 and the Great Depression).
197
See supra Part III.A (explaining that harmonization and centralization of international securities law helps to reduce systemic risk because it ends the race-to-thebottom that is occurring in international securities regulation, provides a seamless
system of regulation that prevents regulatory and enforcement gaps, and reduces
spillover risks from regional or national financial crises).
198
See supra Part III.B (arguing that harmonization and centralization of international securities law will increase the efficiency of the emerging global capital markets by reducing transaction costs, removing barriers to efficiency, and increasing investor confidence).
199
See supra Part III.C (arguing that harmonization and centralization of international securities law will be beneficial because it will pool the expertise and experience of the world’s securities regulators).
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model does have some drawbacks, these drawbacks are far outweighed by the benefits that harmonization and centralization afford.
200

A slow evolutionary process will be required to allow a harmonized and centralized system of international securities regulation to
emerge because nations remain unwilling to shed their nationalistic
and protectionist tendencies relating to securities regulation. With
that said, global capital markets have emerged, and a model of international securities regulation based on harmonization and centralization is the best mechanism to regulate it.

200
See supra Part IV (explaining and rebutting a variety of arguments against harmonization and centralization, including that harmonization and centralization do
not yield the same benefits as regulatory competition, cannot be implemented in the
current international regulatory environment, and would result in a loss of autonomy
for the United States).

